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The paper uses a comprehensive data set with bilateral direct investment flows and establishes 
the influence of the de-facto exchange rate regime for FDI flows. We find a strong and 
significant effect from fixed rates on bilateral FDI flows in developed economies, but no 
significant effect for developing countries. There is thus no general and uniform impact of 
stable exchange rates on FDI. We provide several possible explanations for this difference.  
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1. Introduction  
 
There exists a wide literature on the determinants and causes of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). One chief factor, among many others, should be the exchange rate because changes 
and variability in the external value of the domestic currency change the real value of an 
investment (when investing and when transferring revenue), which also implies that foreign 
investments are accompanied by higher uncertainty. This could either serve as an additional 
incentive to invest abroad (in the sense of optimal portfolio diversification) or it could act as a 
disincentive and at least delay FDI and adjustments in capital flows. Because of inconclusive 
theoretical predictions, the question of influence is basically an empirical one.  
 
Accordingly, there exists a wide empirical literature that aims to decipher the influence of 
(real) current and expected exchange rate levels on FDI flows as well as the influence of 
exchange rate variability (to be reviewed in Section 2). There is very little literature so far, 
however, on the influence of the exchange rate regime. While exchange rate variability and 
the regime should be correlated, we think it is useful to explore the influence of regimes 
independently because the regime is defined over the nominal exchange rate and thus a fixed 
nominal rate does not necessarily imply a constant real rate, which should be decisive for 
investment. Since it is by now well known that declared (de jure) and de facto regimes can 
(and often do) diverge widely, we use the de-facto classification by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) for our study. 
 
In our view, the main additional effect that could come from a regime is the increased 
credibility of a consistent peg. FDI, by definition, is a long-term investment and therefore 
investors should base their decisions on long-term currency developments rather than short-
term expectations about currency movements. While formal declarations of a particular 
regime may increase credibility, one would expect that investors mainly look at de-facto pegs 
rather than de-jure pegs. Moreover, literature on the trade effect of exchange rates regimes has 
also derived that regimes have an impact that goes beyond the mere observation of exchange 
rate variability. Rose (2000) and others have found that there is additional impact of currency 
union on the creation of trade that goes above and beyond the influence of fixed rates. While 
this work has been criticized, and the consensus now is that the effect is much smaller than 
first derived by Rose, it seems that the additional effect of the regime can be held up (Baldwin 
2006).   3
 
Our main contribution in this paper is to combine the widely used Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
classification with a relatively new data set on annual bilateral FDI flows among developed 
and developing countries in a gravity-type model, based on data from 1980 to 2004. These 
data, based on an extensive FDI data set compiled by UNCTAD, are combined with bilateral 
exchange rate regime data; that is, we transform the Reinhart and Rogoff-data set to map 
bilateral FDI with corresponding exchange rate relations. However, we do not only include 
formal monetary unions but also use undeclared fixed regimes as reflecting stable currency 
relations.  
 
In contrast to earlier literature on exchange rate levels and variability we find that bilateral 
FDI flows do not, in general, depend on whether countries have a de-facto fixed exchange rate 
with one another. While we find a consistent and positive effect of fixed rates on FDI among 
developed countries, the same is not true for developing countries. Thus, the evidence is 
different for different types of countries. Also, our results for levels and variability are mixed 
so that unambiguous statements are not possible. While we find a significant positive effect of 
the (real) exchange rate level for developed countries, the effect turns negative for developing 
countries. We cannot find any significant impact of exchange rate variability. In this respect, 
we cannot confirm the results found earlier when looking at bilateral investment flows. Our 
results thus also negate those studies that found such an influence when looking at aggregate 
FDI flows to or from a given country. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of the literature on 
exchange rates and FDI to be able to compare our results with those found earlier. Section 3 
describes the empirical approach, introduces all variables and explains the new FDI data set 
used. While Section 4 presents our empirical results, the paper concludes in Section 5 with a 
discussion of the main results and some policy implications. 
 
 
2. The Literature on FDI and Exchange Rates 
 
The broad literature on the relation between FDI and exchange rates can be distinguished into 
three main strands: the influence of the current (and expected) level of the exchange rate, its 
variability, and a nascent literature on the question of whether a particular exchange rate   4
regime, such as a monetary union, influences FDI. Since there are several surveys on this 
literature (Pain and van Welsum 2003, Kiyota and Urata 2004, Bloningen 2005, Buch and 
Kleinert 2008, Becker and Hall 2009), our review is very brief and summarizes only the main 
arguments and findings. 
 
Theoretically, it is not obvious that the exchange rate should have an impact on FDI decisions 
because costs of setting up a firm and revenues from the investment are denominated in the 
same currency, but most literature assumes that the real exchange rate is not constant and that 
it influences the domestic price of FDI and the real value of revenues transferred to the home 
country.  
 
Cushman (1985), Froot and Stein (1991), Klein and Rosengreen (1994), Bloningen (1997), 
Caves (1989) and Kogut and Chang (1996), looking at different time periods and different 
source countries, all find that FDI inflows into the USA increase with a fall in the value of the 
dollar.
1 However, Froot and Stein find that it only holds for the manufacturing sector, and 
Bloningen finds that an appreciation in the bilateral US Dollar-Yen real exchange rate leads to 
an increase in acquisitions of high R&D firms in the manufacturing sector, whereas for non-
manufacturing low R&D industries, this effect is much weaker and not significant. An 
explanation could be that greenfield investments do not involve any acquisition of firm-
specific assets and may be thus less sensitive to exchange rate levels (Pain and Van Welsum 
2003). Looking at investments in the service sector, Tomlin (2008) finds that an appreciation 
of the dollar leads to more capital inflows into the US service industry. 
 
Likewise, Dewenter (1995) and Stevens (1998) find that an appreciation of the dollar leads to 
more inflows in general. Chakrabati and Scholnick (2002), in examining the effects of US 
dollar exchange rates on FDI inflows in US dollar terms from the US to OECD host countries 
for a sample of 20 OECD countries over the period from 1982 to 1995, find no robust effects 
(see also Udomkerdmonkol et al. 2006). Thus, although most studies confirm the existence of 
the negative correlation between the level of the dollar exchange rate and the flow of FDI into 
the US by looking at certain groups of countries, industries and periods of observation, it is 
unclear how robust these results are. 
 
                                                 
1 They find a similar relationship for flows to West Germany, but not for the UK, Canada or Japan.   5
Xing (2006) and Xing and Wang (2006) stress an additional aspect by looking at the influence 
of exchange rate levels if production in the host country is mainly used as an export platform. 
They find that investment in China is positively related to the depreciation of the Yuan, 
diverting investment from alternative locations in Asia.  
 
Turning to variability, theoretical arguments indicate that the relation between exchange rate 
volatility and FDI could go either way. Aizenman and Marion (2001) argue that vertical FDI 
is inhibited rather than encouraged by increasing exchange rate volatility but that horizontal 
FDI, which is prevalent in industrialised countries, can be encouraged by exchange rate 
uncertainty because it creates opportunities to shift production to countries with more 
advantageous exchange rates. In the case of vertical FDI, high exchange rate volatility can 
delay investment because there is a chance the investment can be made at a more favourable 
exchange rate later. Naturally, the option value of waiting increases in uncertainty (Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994, Rivoli and Salorio 1996, Dunning 1988, Bloningen 1997), so increasing 
uncertainty increases the probability that investors will choose the option of postponing 
investment. 
 
Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) and Sung and Lapan (2000) as well stress that by engaging in 
FDI firms buy an option to shift production in response to exchange rate fluctuations and, 
since this option is positively correlated with the variability of the exchange rate, more 
volatility should actually lead to more FDI.
2 Goldberg and Kolstad (1995), looking at two-
way bilateral FDI flows between the US, Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom over the 
period from 1978 to 1991, confirm that higher volatility has a significant positive effect on the 
ratio of outward FDI in four of six cases. Others who find similar results are Cushman (1985, 
1988, 2001), Stokman and Vlaar (1996) and Dewenter (1995) for US related flows, and De 
Ménil (1999) for a broader sample of OECD countries in a gravity model of bilateral FDI 
flows.  
 
Again, in line with the theoretical arguments, empirical evidence is mixed. While Campa 
(1993) finds a negative influence of volatility of the US Dollar on the number of non-
manufacturing transactions by Japanese investors in the US, only limited effects are found by 
Campa and Goldberg (1999) and Lafrance and Tessier (2001) for FDI to Canada, Crowley 
                                                 
2 Aizenman (1992), however, shows that in the presence of particular types of real and nominal shocks, FDI may 
be stimulated more by a fixed exchange rate regime than by a floating rate regime.   6
and Lee (2002) for bilateral flows in a panel of 18 OECD countries, and Görg and Wakelin 
(2002) for the level of inward and outward FDI to the US from 12 OECD countries. Russ 
(2007) argues that the impact of variability on investment depends on whether volatility is 
driven by shocks in the home or host country.  
 
Limited evidence can also be due to non-linear reactions of investment to an increase in 
volatility. For periods with excessively volatile exchange rate movements, Crowley and Lee 
(2002) find a stronger volatility-investment relationship than for periods with moderate 
movements in the exchange rate, and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2001) find a significant 
negative short and long-run impact on inflows of FDI into the US, whereas they see no 
significant impact from an unconditional measure of volatility (i.e., the rolling standard 
deviation) on FDI. Serven (2003) instead finds that exchange rate variability only matters 
beyond a certain threshold level in his study for developing countries.  
 
Interestingly, Pain (2003) reports a change in the effects of exchange rate volatility on FDI 
over the period from 1981 to 1999. While the high real exchange rate volatility has a 
significant positive influence on inward investment from Germany into other European 
countries during the early and late 1990s, greater exchange rate volatility discouraged FDI 
over the remaining periods. This could be a possible reason for the divergent results reported 
in various studies concerning the effect of exchange rate volatility on FDI.  
 
Barrel et al. (2003) also provide a finer grained picture by reporting that an increase in the 
volatility of the Sterling-Dollar real exchange rates lowers FDI from the US to the UK 
relative to the Euro area, whereas greater volatility of the Euro-Dollar exchange rate increases 
the UK share. Furthermore, the authors find that greater Sterling-Dollar volatility has a 
significant positive impact on absolute amounts of FDI in the United Kingdom, while greater 
Euro-Dollar volatility has a significant negative impact on the absolute levels of US FDI in 
both the United Kingdom and the Euro area.
3  
 
Moreover, it seems that turning to countries other than the US and other OECD countries 
might influence evidence. Hubert and Pain (1999) and Udomkerdmongkolm et al. (2006), for 
                                                 
3 Becker and Hall (2009) as well stress that the whole matrix of exchange rate variability should be decisive for 
FDI. They expect that an entry by the UK into the European Monetary Union would raise FDI from the US to 
the UK. An increase of euro-dollar variability instead relocates FDI from the euro area to the UK.   7
instance, obtain a negative relationship between nominal bilateral exchange rate volatility for 
FDI in developing countries and emerging markets, which is explained by Bénassy-Quéré et 
al. (2001) with the argument that transfer pricing is particularly sensitive to exchange rate 
fluctuations. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) note that exchange rate volatility is often only an 
indication of deeper institutional and policy problems and therefore only indirectly causes the 
negative effects on FDI.
4  
 
Hence, it seems again that it is hard to draw general conclusions for all countries and all 
periods. While there is strong evidence that firms aim to mitigate exchange rate risk by 
establishing production plants in countries with large markets, the effect of exchange rate 
volatility on vertical FDI seems to be rather negative. By drawing general conclusions, one 
has to bear in mind this evidence is mainly based on developed countries and that results often 
reflect specific circumstances. Among themselves, developed countries mainly engage in 
horizontal investment or try to acquire R&D intensive companies with firm-specific assets. 
This is most likely not the prime motive for FDI flowing into developing countries.  
 
While the literature is mainly concerned with real exchange rate variability, the question also 
arises if a nominal peg influences the relation independently. Clearly, nominal pegs are per se 
not related to real exchange rates, but most literature argues that a reduction in nominal 
volatility also has an impact on real exchange rates.  
 
Only very little work so far has focused on one particular example of an extreme exchange 
rate regime: the European Monetary Union (EMU). One study on the effects of the EMU on 
FDI is by Schiavo (2007). Using data for a sample of 25 OECD countries covering the period 
from 1980 to 2001 in conjunction with the gravity model, he shows that fixing the bilateral 
exchange rates by setting up the currency union has encouraged FDI. He concludes that 
adopting the same currency seems to bring about more than only elimination of the exchange 
rate volatility. Another recent study by Petroulas (2007), using panel data of unilateral FDI 
flows among 18 developed countries between 1992 and 2001, shows that the creation of EMU 
caused an increase of FDI in various directions. Inward FDI from within the Euro area rose by 
16 percent, FDI from member countries to non-member countries rose by 11 percent, whereas 
                                                 
4 Of course, since FDI is driven by many additional factors such as growth, income and institutional quality. The 
exchange rate regime, by affecting these variables, may have an indirect effect on FDI. We discuss this in more 
detail below.   8
inward FDI from non-member countries to member countries rose by only 8 percent. It is 
clear, however, that both studies are based on only a few observations after the creation of 
EMU and should thus be interpreted with caution. 
 
 
3. Empirical Approach and Data 
 
Since theoretical predictions about the impact of the exchange rate regime on FDI flows are 
ambiguous and the previous literature on the link between exchange rate variables and FDI is 
inconclusive, we proceed with an empirical analysis as indicated. As for the empirical 
approach, we use a gravity-type model across countries and over time. Since we analyse the 
link between bilateral exchange rate regimes and bilateral FDI flows, this model is highly 
suitable for the empirical investigation. Our basic model specification, which includes FDI 
determinants that address horizontal (market-seeking) and vertical (efficiency-seeking) FDI, 
reads as follows: 
 
(1)                           ε λ FixRegime   α Y φ' X γ' α FDI ln  ijt jt t ijt 1 ijt it 0 ijt + μ + + + + + =  
 
where FDIijt stands for foreign direct investment of country i in country j at period t, Xit 
represents a set of host country control variables, Yijt denotes the difference between source 
and host country characteristics, FixRegimeijt corresponds to a fixed exchange rate regime 
between the source and the host country, λt is a set of year dummies, and μjt and εijt represent 
host-year effects and the error term, respectively. We use a standard (OLS) fixed-effects panel 
regression model, as the Hausman test indicates that this estimator would be more appropriate 
than a random-effects model. 
 
As concerns the dependent variable, we use FDI flows from the source to the host country in 
US$ million (the variable is labelled FDI).
5 Importantly, the limited host country coverage of 
previous analyses of bilateral FDI flows is overcome by fully exploiting the (largely 
unpublished) data available upon request from UNCTAD’s Data Extract Service (UNCTAD 
2009a). We use annual bilateral FDI flows in logs to reduce the skewness of the data. Before 
                                                 
5 In addition to FDI flows in absolute values, we could have used FDI as a share of the host country’s GDP as 
another dependent variable. However, estimates for this variable are difficult to interpret due to the fact that GDP 
stands on both sides of the equation.   9
taking the natural logarithm, we set the small number of negative FDI flows equal to zero and 
add one to include as many observations as possible.
6 
 
As regards the control variables, we employ a relatively standard set of measures, including 
total host country GDP for market seeking FDI (GDP),
7 the difference in GDP per capita 
between the source and the host country for vertical FDI (DiffGDPpc), host country openness 
to trade (Openness), a dummy for the existence of a bilateral or regional trading agreement, 
that is, a free trade agreement or customs union (RTA), another dummy for a bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT), and the inflation rate of the host country to control for 
macroeconomic distortions (Inflation).
8 Finally, we include an indicator for the institutional 
development of host countries, proxied by political constraints on the executive branch 
(PolCon). Poor institutions may discourage FDI by giving rise to uncertainty (e.g., with 
respect to the protection of property rights; Lee and Mansfield 1996, Henisz 2000) and 
additional costs (e.g., in the case of corruption; Wei 2000). Apart from Inflation, we expect a 
positive association of all these control variables with FDI. 
 
As noted in the introduction, the classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is used for the 
variable of principal interest, that is, the exchange rate regime.
9 One reason for this choice is 
that it is available for a long time period and for a large country sample. Moreover, their 
system of classification depicts the real exchange rate regime quite adequately.
10 Since we are 
only interested in the difference between fixed and non-fixed regimes, we use the coarse grid 
classification system from Reinhart and Rogoff to determine whether a pair of countries has a 
fixed exchange rate. More specifically, FixRegime represents a dummy variable, taking the 
value one for a fixed exchange rate regime between the source and host country and the value 
zero for all other exchange rate regimes. The dummy is equal to one for hard pegs, that is, for 
a pair of two (or more) countries without a separate legal tender, those with a pre-announced 
                                                 
6 In fact, less than 4 percent of all FDI values in our sample are negative. 
7 Note that we use nominal GDP, since there is no adequate deflator available for FDI in many developing 
countries. Using instead the US deflator is likely to bias the results (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006). 
8 See Busse et al. (2010) for the impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI. Appendix A provides exact 
definitions and data sources for all variables; descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix B. Similar to FDI, 
we take the natural logarithm of GDP and Inflation. 
9 We extend the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) data set to the year 2004 with data provided by Eichengreen and 
Razo-Garcia (2006), as they use the same classification.  
10 Alternative classifications are provided by Ghosh et al. (2002) who base their sample on official exchange rate 
declarations, or Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) who study the volatility of official exchange rate and 
currency reserves, while Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) look at the volatility of the relevant (possibly inofficial) 
exchange rate. For a discussion of these different classifications, see Harms and Kretschmann (2009).   10
peg or currency board arrangement, those with a horizontal band narrower than +/- 2% and 
those with a de facto peg.
11 We expect a positive association of a fixed exchange rate regime 
on FDI flows, as uncertainty about exchange rate movements would decrease and, 
consequently, the risk premium for foreign investors would be lower. Moreover, in the case of 
the developing host countries, a “disciplined” monetary policy ensuring low and stable 
inflation rates could be imported vis-à-vis a fixed exchange rate where monetary 
independence would be foregone. 
 
The percentage of hard pegs in developed countries was zero in 1997 and increased to 52 
percent in 2004 due to the introduction of the euro (Table 1). The number of intermediate 
regimes decreased whereas the number of floating regimes hardly changed, in particular 
between 1997 and 2004. With regard to emerging market economies and developing 
countries, the number of hard pegs remained relatively stable or increased slightly over the 
time period between 1990 and 2004, but the floating regimes became more prevalent. The 
number of countries categorised as “freely floating” decreased to 0 and around 2 percent, 
respectively, in these countries.  
 
                                                 
11 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) for details.   11
Table 1: Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes Using the Reinhart and Rogoff Natural 
Classification (Percentage of Members in Each Category) 
   1990 1997 2004
All Countries           
Hard pegs  22.5 24.5 34.1
Intermediate  45.8 51.1 32.6
Floating  15.8 13.7 31.9
Freely falling  15.8 10.8 1.5
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0
No. of Countries  120 139 138
Developed Countries 
Hard pegs  4.4 0.0 52.2
Intermediate  73.9 65.2 13.0
Floating  21.7 34.8 34.8
Freely falling  0.0 0.0 0.0
Total  100.0 100.0 100.00
No. of Countries  23 23 23
Emerging Countries 
Hard pegs  10.0 12.5 16.1
Intermediate  60.0 53.1 41.9
Floating  10.0 18.7 41.9
Freely falling  20.0 15.6 0.0
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0
No. of Countries  30 32 31
Developing Countries 
Hard pegs  34.3 35.7 35.7
Intermediate  29.9 46.4 34.5
Floating  16.4 5.9 27.4
Freely falling  19.4 11.9 2.4
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0
No. of Countries  67 84 84
Source: Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006).  
 
As further control variables, we use the real exchange rate vs. the US Dollar 
(ExchangeRateReal) and its standard deviation (ExchangeRateVolatility). Whereas higher 
values for ExchangeRateVolatility indicate an increase in the volatility of the (real) exchange 
rate, measured by the standard deviation, an increase in ExchangeRateReal refers to a 
depreciation of the host country currency. As the survey of previous empirical studies in 
Section 2 has shown, the signs for both ExchangeRateVolatility and ExchangeRateReal are 
unclear.  
 
Our analysis covers the period 1980-2004. UNCTAD’s Data Extract Service provides FDI 
data since 1970, but very few countries report FDI flows for the 1970s at a bilateral level. To 
avoid any biases arising from an extremely small sample of reporting countries, we start with 
1980. We include the maximum number of source and host countries for which bilateral FDI 
flows are available, except financial offshore centres, such as Panama, The Bahamas, or the   12
Cayman Islands.
12 Extending the sample to include a large number of poor developing host 
countries is crucial to avoid a sample selection bias and to assess the chances of these 
countries becoming more attractive to FDI. Overall, our sample consists of 102 developed and 
developing host countries. By covering 31 source countries of FDI, including various non-
OECD source countries, we at least partly capture the recent surge of FDI flows from 




4. Empirical Results 
 
Following the model specification and the introduction of the variables, we now turn to the 
empirical results. Columns (1) to (3) in Table 2 report the results for the full sample of host 
countries. The first estimation (Model I) includes all control variables introduced before, 
except for RTA, BIT and PolCon since provisions in regional/bilateral treaties or institutional 
quality might have a similar effect on FDI flows as the exchange rate regime. In Models II 
and III, we then add these further control variables.  
 
Almost all control variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 10 
percent level or better. The strongly positive coefficient of the host countries’ GDP (GDP) 
reveal that FDI flows to the sample countries are driven by market-seeking motives. Whereas 
the difference between the GDP per capita does not seem to matter for the full sample, 
DiffGDPpc has the expected positive coefficient and is highly significant as we focus on 
subsamples later on. The importance of vertical FDI is also stressed by the significantly 
positive coefficients of Openness and RTA; greater openness to trade reflected in these two 
variables improves the host countries’ attractiveness to FDI involving the relocation of 
particular segments of the value chain and the offshoring of intermediate production.  
 
Also in line with our expectations, macroeconomic distortions, proxied by the inflation rate, 
are associated with lower bilateral FDI flows. While the ratification of a bilateral investment 
treaty is associated with higher FDI flows, PolCon remains insignificant. As noted in 
Section 3,  PolCon  refers to political discretion of the executive branch, which might not 
                                                 
12 The FDI data for financial offshore centers are highly likely to be biased. We exclude all countries that are on 
the list of offshore financial centers as reported by Eurostat (2005). 
13 See Appendix C and Appendix D for the source and host country sample.   13
involve strong risks for foreign investors. More precise measures for political risk are 
unfortunately not available for the extended period under consideration. The overall fit of the 
three models is reasonable, taking into account that we include some 45,500 observations and 
slightly more than 3,000 bilateral (sometimes quite heterogeneous) country pairs. 
 
Turning to the exchange rate-related determinants of FDI for the full sample, our results show 
that the real exchange rate level is negatively associated with FDI, that is, an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate attracts more FDI. However, the estimated coefficients do not reach the 
conventional 10 percent threshold level. As we split the total sample into two subsamples, that 
is, into developing and developed host countries, reported in columns 4 to 9, we observe a 
negative impact for developing and a positive impact for developed countries. Still, for both 
subsamples ExchangeRateReal is not a significant determinant of bilateral foreign investment. 
Our results with respect to this variable are thus in line with the inconclusive evidence 
reported by previous studies (see Section 2). For the exchange rate volatility, we find a 
positive and weakly significant link with FDI flows for the total host country sample. Yet the 
coefficients for ExchangeRateVolatility are not significant in most model specifications for 
both subsamples.  
 
Regarding the variable of principle interest, we find that a fixed exchange rate regime is 
strongly positively associated with FDI flows. The coefficients for FixRegime are highly 
significant at the 1 percent level in all three model specifications. The quantitative effect of 
having a fixed exchange rate on FDI inflows is considerable. Taking the estimated coefficient 
on FixRegime for the full sample of host countries and all control variables (0.585) at face 
value, the switch from a floating to a hard peg is associated with an increase in FDI inflows 
by some 76.6%.
14 Hence, the impact of a fixed exchange rate is not only quite sizeable, it is 
larger than the effects of both ratifying a regional trade agreement or a bilateral investment 
treaty. 
 
Looking again at the disaggregated results for developing and developed host countries, the 
coefficients for FixRegime are always positive but only significant for developed countries, 
                                                 
14 As pointed out by Kennedy (1981), the percentage change in the dependent variable due to the change in a 
dummy variable from zero to one in a semi-logarithmic specification amounts to 100x{exp[estimated coefficient 
of dummy variable – ½(estimated variance of coefficient)]-1}.   14
not for developing countries.
15 Obviously, the results for developed countries are influenced 
by the introduction of the euro in 1999 which seems to be associated with an increase in FDI 
flows. This outcome is in line with the results reported by Schiavo (2007) and Petroulas 
(2007) who both find a positive impact of the introduction of the euro on FDI inflows. Note, 
however, that FixRegime  goes beyond EMU, as it measures various fixed exchange rate 
regimes for EMU countries before 1999 (and for non-EMU countries, such as the UK and 
Denmark) and for several countries with hard pegs vis-à-vis the US dollar for diverging years 




                                                 
15 Since Canada, Ireland and Norway do not report FDI outflows for developing countries at a bilateral level, we 
had to exclude them from the set of reporter countries in those regressions that focus on developing host 
countries only.   15
Table 2: FDI and Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes, OLS Fixed Effects  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country Group   All Countries  Developing Countries  Developed Countries 
Model    I II  III I II  III I II  III 
           
ln  GDP  0.274*** 0.257*** 0.251*** 0.319*** 0.301*** 0.293***  0.434**  0.434**  0.429* 
  (6.915) (6.621) (6.450) (7.563) (7.350) (7.171) (1.979) (1.970) (1.936) 
DiffGDPpc  -0.00424  -0.00562  -0.00565  0.0414*** 0.0406*** 0.0394*** 0.0484*** 0.0484*** 0.0471*** 
  (-0.644)  (-0.857)  (-0.863) (4.389) (4.371) (4.217) (2.846) (2.837) (2.759) 
Openness  0.00239*** 0.00224*** 0.00223*** 0.00248*** 0.00228*** 0.00228***  0.0173***  0.0172***  0.0172*** 
  (3.782) (3.592) (3.553) (3.798) (3.552) (3.561) (3.473) (3.463) (3.446) 
ln Inflation  -0.0173***  -0.0148**  -0.0141**  -0.0211*** -0.0186*** -0.0167***  -0.0195  -0.0195  -0.0221 
  (-2.988) (-2.564) (-2.399) (-3.360) (-2.963) (-2.601) (-0.841) (-0.838) (-0.981) 
RTA     0.474***  0.446***     0.657***  0.600***     -0.0156  -0.00203 
     (5.732)  (5.517)     (6.449)  (6.010)     (-0.118)  (-0.0154) 
BIT        0.146***        0.237***        -0.114 
        (2.872)        (3.968)        (-1.242) 
PolCon        -0.0539        0.0921        -0.457 
        (-0.816)        (1.398)        (-0.667) 
FixRegime 0.577***  0.581***  0.585***  0.208  0.167  0.142  0.397**  0.396**  0.389** 
  (4.088) (4.108) (4.122) (1.054) (0.850) (0.715) (2.244) (2.237) (2.191) 
ExchangeRateReal  -0.000016 -0.000015 -0.000016 -0.000037 -0.000027 -0.000030 0.000131  0.000126  0.000086 
  (-1.040) (-1.005) (-1.101) (-0.219) (-0.164) (-0.185) (0.183)  (0.177)  (0.120) 
ExchangeRateVolatility  0.161*  0.152*  0.149*  0.159*  0.147 0.134 1.500 1.510 1.874 
  (1.914) (1.803) (1.758) (1.716) (1.583) (1.437) (0.711) (0.715) (0.869) 
           
Observations  45,529 45,529 45,454 31,324 31,324 31,273 11,178 11,178 11,160 
Country  pairs  3,030 3,030 3,029 2,096 2,096 2,096  701  701  700 
R
2  0.21 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity; due to space constraints, the coefficients for the year dummies are not shown; *** significant at 
1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
 
   16
Table 3: FDI and Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes, PPML Fixed Effects  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Country Group   All Countries  Developing Countries  Developed Countries 
Model    I II  III I II  III I II  III 
           
ln  GDP  0.321*** 0.303*** 0.284*** 0.284*** 0.272*** 0.271*** 0.231*** 0.236*** 0.212*** 
  (10.82) (10.11) (9.460) (7.540) (7.202) (7.172) (3.503) (3.564) (3.170) 
DiffGDPpc 0.0139***  0.0130***  0.00899***  0.0147*  0.00906  0.00605  -0.00191  -0.00182  -0.00227 
  (4.594) (4.282) (2.915) (1.773) (1.079) (0.718) (-0.432)  (-0.410)  (-0.511) 
Openness  0.00198*** 0.00180*** 0.00175***  0.00009  0.000022  0.000168  0.00444*** 0.00448*** 0.00434*** 
  (3.770) (3.397) (3.297) (0.148)  (0.0355)  (0.271) (3.293) (3.319) (3.207) 
ln Inflation  -0.0105*  -0.00978*  -0.00720  -0.0123* -0.0136** -0.0126*  -0.00939  -0.0105  -0.0116 
  (-1.918) (-1.792) (-1.310) (-1.801) (-1.988) (-1.840) (-0.883) (-0.983) (-1.068) 
RTA     0.131***  0.102***     0.150***  0.140***     -0.0676  -0.0749 
     (4.248)  (3.274)     (4.124)  (3.848)     (-1.005)  (-1.113) 
BIT        0.159***        0.102***        0.327*** 
        (5.942)        (3.360)        (4.545) 
PolCon        0.190***        0.0400        -0.152 
        (3.560)        (0.655)        (-1.023) 
FixRegime -0.00735  -0.00258  0.00756  -0.0180  -0.0132  -0.0250  0.0712**  0.0710**  0.0747** 
 (-0.284)  (-0.0996)  (0.292)  (-0.280)  (-0.206)  (-0.387)  (2.422)  (2.416)  (2.544) 
ExchangeRateReal -0.000016  -0.000015  -0.000017  -0.000022** -0.000021** -0.000021** 0.00076***  0.00075***  0.00066*** 
  (-1.615) (-1.585) (-1.792) (-2.287) (-2.184) (-2.201) (3.131)  (3.099)  (2.714) 
ExchangeRateVolatility 0.0671 0.0632 0.0490 0.0710 0.0686 0.0639  0.904  0.922  1.054* 
  (1.344) (1.267) (0.981) (1.398) (1.351) (1.259) (1.509) (1.538) (1.707) 
           
Observations  45,529 45,529 45,454 31,324 31,324 31,273 11,178 11,178 11,160 
Country  pairs  3,030 3,030 3,029 2,096 2,096 2,096  701  701  700 
Notes: See Table 2 for notes; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.     17
5. Robustness Checks and Extensions 
 
Subsequently, we run various further regressions to investigate whether these results hold up. 
To begin with, we use the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator suggested 
by Silva and Tenreyo (2006). Since our dependent variable has a large portion of zeros, that 
is, in the full sample some 34,500 out of 45,500 are zeros, OLS results could be biased. Also, 
as shown by Silva and Tenreyo the PPML estimator can be used even in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. Similar to the OLS approach, we use the PPML fixed-effects estimator and 
the same three model specifications.  
 
Looking at the results for the full sample of host countries, reported in columns 1 to 3 in 
Table 3, all control variables have the expected sign and are significant at the 10 percent level 
or better (apart from the inflation rate in the third model specification). In comparison to the 
OLS results, now the difference between reporter and host country GDP per capita income 
has the expected positive sign and is highly significant at the 1 percent level. Also, the 
coefficient for constraints on the political executive is positive and highly significant.  
 
For all three exchange rate variables, however, we do not obtain any significant results in the 
full sample. This outcome changes as we turn to the two subsamples. While a depreciation of 
the real exchange rate has a positive impact on FDI flows in developing countries (columns 4 
to 6), we obtain the opposite results for developed countries (columns 7 to 9). In line with the 
OLS results, we obtain no significant (or no robust) results for the exchange rate variability in 
both sub-samples. Importantly, the positive and significant impact of having a fixed exchange 
rate on FDI holds up for the developed host country sample (though no longer for the full 
sample). For developing countries, again we do not obtain any significant results for 
FixRegime. Overall, the PPML regressions are roughly in line with the OLS estimates in 
respect of our exchange rate variables. 
 
Next, we further investigate the impact of the fixed exchange rate in developing countries. We 
replicate our estimations for various sub-samples of host and source countries. In view of 
space constraints, we show only the results for the variable of principal interest in the present   18
context and the PPML estimator.
16 To alleviate comparison, the results for FixRegime for 
developing countries from Table 3 are listed again in the first row of Table 4.  
 
As a start, we divide the group of developing host countries into middle- and low-income 
countries (according to the World Bank’s classification). The argument is that the large group 
of developing countries is fairly heterogeneous and the disaggregation could offer additional 
insights. Yet the outcome of this further sample split does not matter much. While the impact 
of a fixed-exchange rate regime on FDI is still negative (and not significant) when 
considering only middle-income countries, the estimated coefficients are somewhat smaller in 
comparison to low-income countries.
17 Next, we check whether the impact of a fixed 
exchange rate regime changes if we exclude developing source countries. It could be argued 
that South-South FDI might differ from North-South FDI, due to difference in motives and 
the sort of foreign investment undertaken. Yet the outcome does not change much.  
 
Finally, we replicate the estimations and exclude certain developing host countries from the 
analysis: First, we exclude resource-intensive host countries, as the motives for investing in 
these countries are likely to differ from the other developing countries. Then, we leave out 
transition countries as a number of these countries received considerable FDI inflows since 
the early 1990s which might not be related to exchange rates policies. Third, we include 
transition countries only. While the coefficients for FixRegime turn positive in the first and 
third set of regressions, we still could not establish a statistically significant link between a 
hard peg and FDI flows in developing countries.  
 
                                                 
16 For OLS estimations, the outcome is very similar. 
17 For low-income countries, the coefficients for Models I and II are identical as there are no RTAs between 
these countries and the FDI source countries included in our analysis.   19
Table 4: Robustness Checks and Extensions, Developing Countries, PPML Fixed Effects 
Model: I  II  III 
Full Developing Host Country Sample (as reported in Table 3)  -0.0180  -0.0132  -0.0250 
 (-0.280)  (-0.206)  (-0.387) 
Middle-income Countries  -0.00840  -0.00202  -0.0142 
 (-0.124)  (-0.0298)  (-0.208) 
Low-income Host Countries  -0.113  -0.113  -0.108 
 (-0.529)  (-0.529)  (-0.506) 
Developed Source Countries   -0.00294  0.000989  -0.0110 
 (-0.0457)  (0.0154)  (-0.170) 
Excl. Resource-intensive Host Countries
1 0.0353  0.0382  0.0291 
 (0.516)  (0.558)  (0.422) 
Excl. Transition Host Countries  -0.0678  -0.0646  -0.0688 
 (-0.909)  (-0.865)  (-0.918) 
Transition Host Countries only  0.136  0.130  0.120 
 (1.064)  (1.012)  (0.920) 
Notes: Due to space constraints, we only report the results for the fixed exchange rate regime variable; see Table 
2 for further notes. 
1Algeria, Bolivia, China, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Guyana, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Oman, Papua New Guinea, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Zambia. 
 
 
6. Interpretation of the Results and Policy Implications 
 
The present paper has reviewed the influence of the exchange rate regime on bilateral FDI 
flows between countries, with mixed results: while we find a positive and significant 
influence of a fixed exchange rate regime for FDI in developed countries, developing 
countries do not receive higher FDI inflows if they employ a hard peg of their currency as a 
policy option.  
 
There are several possible reasons for this. One reason might be that exchange rates are highly 
correlated with other variables, such as macroeconomic stability, trade, growth or institutional 
quality, which all influence FDI. In developing countries, these factors may outweigh the 
influence of fixed exchange rates per se and thus explain our inconsistent findings for 
different county groups. Moreover, it might be that regime changes are faster and more 
frequent in this group of countries. Our main argument for the regime to matter was that fixed 
rates have to do with credibility. If fixed rates in developing countries are less credible than in 
developed countries this could explain that their effect is rather weak in these countries. 
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Another reason could be that real exchange rate stability is not as strongly correlated with 
nominal exchange rate stability in different countries. Since the value of FDI is affected by 
real exchange rates, their changes and variability, nominal regimes are only important in as 
much as they allow making predictions about real exchange rates. If despite a fixed exchange 
rate real rates are more variable in developing countries, the regime loses its predictive power 
for rates.  
 
Finally, it might be that the type of investment in developing countries is of a different nature 
than in developed countries. Earlier literature has already established that for several reasons, 
it might make a difference whether FDI is horizontal or vertical, or in which industry it is 
taking place. If the exchange rate regime has a different effect on different types of FDI, they 
could also have a different influence in different countries if one particular type of investment 
dominates there. 
 
These questions are so far not explored and should be the subject of further work. At least, we 
hope to have demonstrated that the influence of the exchange rate regime is potentially 
important and goes beyond the influence of exchange rate level and variability, which have so 
far been the focus of empirical work. 
 
At the same time, it is reassuring that other researchers have found in other contexts that the 
effect of exchange rate regimes is not the same across all countries. Looking at the effect of 
the exchange rate regime on growth, Harms and Kretschmann (2009) find in their survey 
paper that no effect can be established for developing countries, whereas they find a 
significant effect for developed countries. This seems to indicate that indeed exchange rate 
regimes play different roles in these countries or that, as we suggested above, other factors 
matter more than this particular variable. They also find, however, that flexible exchange rates 
seem to be better for growth in developed countries, which is surprising if one would expect a 
positive relation between growth and FDI. It would be worthwhile to explore this link further.  
 
Moreover, our results offer interesting policy conclusions. Developing countries trying to 
raise their attractiveness for FDI should focus their efforts, for example, on concluding 
bilateral investment treaties or joining regional trade agreements rather than focusing on the 
exchange rate regime. This is different for developed countries. Here, there seems to be an 
additional and quite significant gain from having a fixed exchange rate. Obviously, the results   21
for developed countries are partly driven by the special case of the European Monetary Union. 
Yet it should be kept in mind that our sample is much broader, in that it goes back to the 
1980s, a period where monetary union was not yet established, and that it includes several 
hard pegs for non-EMU countries. Importantly from a policy perspective, our results indicate 
that the impact of a fixed exchange rate regime is quite large, making it a potentially effective 
policy device for developed countries to increase FDI inflows.  
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
FDI  Bilateral FDI flows from source to host country, current 
US$ million 
UNCTAD (2009a) 
GDP  Total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), current US$  World Bank (2009) 
DiffGDPpc Difference  between  source and host GDP per capita, 
current US$ divided by 1,000 
World Bank (2009) 
Openness  Sum of imports and exports in % of GDP (host country)  World Bank (2009) 
Inflation  Inflation rate of host country in % (GDP deflator)  World Bank (2009) 
RTA  Dummy bilateral or regional trade agreement (free trade 
agreement or customs union), 0/1 
WTO (2009) 
BIT  Dummy bilateral investment treaty, 0/1  UNCTAD (2009b) 
PolCon  Political constraints III, Henisz database, ranging from 0 
(no constraints) to 1 (full set of constraints) 
Downloaded from 
Henisz’s homepage 
FixRegime  Classification of fixed exchange rate regime by Reinhart 
and Rogoff, see text for more details  
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), updated by 
Eichengreen and 
Razo-Garcia (2006) 
ExchangeRateReal  Real exchange rate vs. the US dollar, computed by the 
average of the local currency value against the US dollar 
multiplied with the ratio of the US Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) and the local CPI, Index 2000 equal to 100 
IMF (2009) and 
World Bank (2009) 





Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
ln  FDI  45,529  1.03 2.21 0.0  12.7 
ln GDP  45,529  24.01  2.12  18.2  30.1 
DiffGDPpc  45,529  11.09 13.64 -36.6  38.5 
Openness  45,529  72.38 38.85 6.3 275.2 
ln  Inflation  45,529  2.53 1.71 -4.2  10.2 
RTA  45,529  0.14 0.35 0.0  1.0 
BIT  45,529  0.17 0.38 0.0  1.0 
PolCon  45,454  0.32 0.21 0.0  0.7 
FixRegime  45,529  0.03 0.18 0.0  1.0 
ExchangeRateReal  45,529  0.61 2.22 0.01  25,565.3 
ExchangeRateVolatility  45,529  0.03 0.20 0.0  4.2 
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Appendix C: Source Country Sample 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United 




Appendix D: Host Country Sample 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium-Luxembourg, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Republic of 
Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
El  Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, 
Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
 
 